1910
130
extended to the Chinese Empire? English merchants at Shanghae might arrange for their introduction to Peking, whence they would spread to Mongolia. In one place it was said to me that in a few years everyone would avoid Japanese goods as the worthlessness of the specimens now on view would be realized, but I do not think so, for there will always be people to buy trash, and secondly, where the inferior goods now find a market the better class will later on find its way.
Summary.
The situation in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan may be summed up as follows: The Russian policy towards these dependencies is a purely selfish one, its object being to draw them towards the Russian Empire with the view of ultimate absorption. With this object all development except on Russian lines, or on lines approved by her, is to be combatted. This policy results in stagnation of trade except towards Russia; at the same time that sympathies are thus caused to tend towards Russia, the prestige of the Russian Government is to increase by pomp of Cossack force.
The policy of the Russian Government is aided by the inertness of the Chinese Government towards the provinces. The adoption, however, of a policy of development has caused some perturbation. In addition to this there is a growing desire on the part of Peking to have everything reported there. This latter can be checked and frustrated by the insidious support of those candidates for posts who are Russophil or corrupt or weak. These prove easy tools in the hands of able Russian Consular authorities, and either fail to report Russian encroachments or actions until these have become precedents, or else, if they report, may be expected to do so in the most rosy light, while at the same time they may be trusted to support the Russian policy of non-development except on Russian lines. All other appointments except those approved by the Russian Government are cavilled at. Hence the alarm at the energetic action of the Chinese Government in Altaishan and at the dispatch thither of a Peking Manchu in close sympathy with his Government; and it was an intimation that the Chinese Government meant business when they sent a large force there at the same time. With no Consular agent on the spot, such an official could not be tampered with. Failing, therefore, the support of His Majesty's Government towards a non-development policy, all efforts will be directed towards obtaining the recall or disgrace of the officers before the colony has developed too far, and efforts will be made to obtain the appointment of a man approved of by the Russian local authorities, i.e., a man who can be counted on not to continue work or to work only in sympathy with the Russians.
The Chinese Government seem to be aware of the danger to the dependencies and to be alive to the need for development from the side of China. It depends on how steady they are against Russian threats as to whether they are to succeed or fail.
The traveller through Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan cannot but be impressed by the excellence of these provinces as buffers between the two Empires and the real need that these should remain such, to allow China time to reform herself and to come into line with the west.
་
Possibilities of a Mahommedan Rebellion,
His Majesty's Government will not of course be ignorant of the Moslem rebellions of the last sixty years, of 1847, 1857, 1667-1877 (Yakub Beg), 1895 (Ninghsia), each of which was accompanied by the most terrible massacres of Chinese and Moslems alike, and which in each case ended by the gradual resumption of Chinese sovereignty over their revolted subjects. Manchu insolence and misgovernment, accompanied by open alarm on the part of the Chinese of their Mahommedan fellow-subjects, and comparison by the latter of the well-being of their co-religionists on the Russian side of the frontier are doing much to bring about a repetition of these historical facts. What will the Chinese Government do if another rebellion breaks out in the near future? West and north of Urumtsi the military force is practically non-existent. Directly the flame breaks out these lands are lost to China except the fortress walls in which the Chinese will cower, too terrified and too inefficient to do anything. Much depends on the efficiency of the force at Urumtsi; if that fails the Chinese the rebellion will run at once to Ninghsia and Kansu, Shansi, and Shensi; it is open to doubt whether this will not do so in any case in spite of Urumtsi which will be left as an oasis in the midst of rebellion. The Chinese Government will then have to start to repress the rebellion in the near provinces, rescue Urumtsi and gradually reconquer Chinese Turkestan.
What will the Russian attitude be during all that time? It will be remembered
131
that in the other rebellions her hands were full in Europe. Central Asia was still balf unconquered, there was no Central Asian Railway, the Siberian Railway only a dream. What is the position to-day? Central Asia held down, lines of railways and telegraphs to within a short distance of the frontier, a vast trade along the whole line Can the Russian Government from Kuldja to Urga, all threatened by the rebellion. remain inactive and even if they wish to, will they be able to restrain their Moslem subjects on the border or will they care to do so, lest their own prestige should suffer and their subjects complain that the Russian Government is unable to protect Turki and Hassack interests.
In conclusion of that portion of the journey which lay in China (over six and a-half months), I have the honour to observe that although by force of circumstances the journey during two of these was performed in a manner highly disappointing and intensely unsatisfactory to myself yet this report has in no way suffered, for precisely the same route was taken as had been intended had I been able to form my own caravan in Mongolia. The reverse has indeed occurred, for it became clear in North Mongolia that in order to have carried out the entire programme as arranged with my own animals, another two months would have been necessary on account of the frequent halts which it would have been necessary to make for the sake of resting the camels, while had a surveyor accompanied the party either the time must have been protracted to a year or the journey very considerably curtailed.
Now that the end of the journey in China has been reached it may also be of use Certain things were to observe that it was one involving no danger and little risk. necessary such as good health, energy, patience, a good temper, and last but perhaps as great as any, enthusiasm. Patience and a good temper, if not natural gifts, must be acquired for the time being. Good health is necessary for if this were to break down in the desert the traveller has no help at hand save himself. Energy is necessary to continue the march day after day be the weather good or bad, or however gloomy one may feel, to keep servants and camel men or carters up to the mark, for if the traveller flags, much more so will the retinue, to keep constantly on the alert in case of danger to life or property. Patience is necessary to deal with Chinese officials, natives, camel- drivers, and carters, to continue slowly day after day knowing that with camels the utmost you can do will be 30 miles a-day, and to deal with and thwart the dishonesty of servants; a good temper is necessary to stand the inquisitiveness of the crowd, their silly questions, and the Chinese mind which thinks so slowly and by such different methods to our own.
With all these one can defeat the many difficulties that arise and without them it is better not to travel in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.
SECTION IX.--KULDJA TO LONDON.
October 30.--It was a terrible day, and a snow blizzard was raging from the west; in spite of this it was absolutely necessary to make a start. We slept at Suidun.
October 31.-The Chiang chün sent a small officer from Hsincheng in the early hours of the morning with presents of meat, cigars, cigarettes, and biscuits for the journey.
It had snowed all night, and continued to do so during most of the day. The road was very bad, and the carriage frequently threatened to capsize. A good deal of swampy ground had to be forded, and the water almost entered the carriage in places.
Passing through Chinese Khorgos (another of the Hsien towns) in the early afternoon, we were stopped shortly afterwards at a gateway in the road, where our passports were examined by an opium sot. My servant and the driver produced theirs; I was too cold to look for mine. Emerging from the gateway we reached the broad stony bed of the small Khorgos stream, the boundary between Russia and China; we pulled up at Russian Khorgos, the Customs station and a military post, lying in a belt of trees on the west side of the stream. We reached Djarkend about 8:0 P.M.
Here began our journey by the Russian posting system, which did not end until we reached Omsk, on the Siberian Railway, on the 20th November. We kept westwards as far as Altenimel, where we turned north through the mountains to Kopal, and thence over the plains at the east end of Lake Balkash to Sergiopol (the 9th November); here we had to cross over low hills to the valley of the Irtish at Semipalatinsk; (the 12th November) the river being frozen we were unable to proceed by steamer, and had to continue by road down the right bank of the river to Omsk.
Except for bitter winds the weather was good nearly all the time; this was fortunate as we had to travel day and night by open sledge without stopping. The snow lay deep
1
3
38
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.